Credit Markets for Dummies / Bankers

Last week, I was complaining about the idiocy of the CEO's of the major banks in their sub-prime and general end-of-cycle lending practices. Although I thought that these folks should be smart enough to understand cyclical risk in mortgage lending, apparently it has escaped them.

While your servant is just a humble real-estate appraiser in his real life (and a former branch manager for Household Finance), I didn't think understanding changes in real estate values or basic credit lending (and hence, value at risk for a bank) was too complicated.

Apparently, though, I was mistaken. Hence, my new class, Credit Markets and Residential Real Estate Values 101. Now, I want the heads of Citibank, Bank of America, et.al. to stop goofing off, and sit at the front desks here.

Prince! Up Front!! What? You've been canned? (oops, "resigned under pressure") Well, all the more reason to sit up front here. Now pay attention!

This is pretty simple.

1. First of all - don't lend to people who can't afford to repay you - yes, over the long term - not just based on the teaser rates!


2. Check their references - i.e. confirm their income, debts, payments, etc.


3. Medium-to-longer term changes in real estate values (which is really what the bank's security is predicated upon) is based almost completely on just three factors. Pay attention to those factors, since they can affect values!

The three factors affecting the medium-term plus value of real estate are:

a. Changes in population in an area;

b. Changes in after-tax income;

c. Changes in interest rates.

Prince, note that unsustainable changes or trends (as an example, interest rates at historic or near historic lows, eg 2001-2005) will have the effect of exagerating short-term property values. Meaning, in the context of real estate values, circa 2002-2007, they are likely to become OVERSTATED due to "c" above. And thus impair balance sheets.

Note: If you're on a blog aggregator, you can visit The Confused Capitalist here (or here: http://confusedcapitalist.blogspot.com/) for additional articles and exclusive content!

No one could have predicted this? I pull some narrative commentary from my own appraisals dealing with values in 2003 ...

"... the local housing market continues to set records, fuelled by both low interest rates, and a relative shortage of product."

... in 2004 ...

"Lending rates remain at near-historic lows, and continue to support economic activity of all kinds, but low rates are well-known to provide significant boosts in pricing and activity in the housing sector."

... and in 2006 ...

"Lending rates remain at near-historic lows, and continue to support economic activity of all kinds, but low rates are well-known to provide significant boosts in pricing and activity in the real estate sector."

Prince, Prince!! Pay attention.

JW

The Confused Capitalist

Challenging conventional wisdom

As investors, it's important - if we want to outperform the indices - to think differently. And that means challenging accepted conventional wisdoms, by continually asking questions that reveal underlying assumptions. Also, looking at the quality and quantity of the data before us, can also help us become better investors too.

I enjoy reading articles that consider common investing mistakes, so that I can hopefully minimize these mistakes myself. One recent one I read (by way of Abnormal Returns) was a list of 15 common biases reported at The Kirk Report, from the investor magazine, Trader Monthly. The list is full of good stuff.

But I finally (i.e. years late) suffered some cognitive dissonance when reading item #12 on the list ...

12) Asymmetry of risk tolerance: Investors are risk-averse with regard to gains (preferring to sell "winners" and ensure the gain) but risk-takers when it comes to losses (preferring to hang on to "losers").

Now this isn't the first time or place that I've read this statement, but I finally realized that this is in complete contrast to two other accepted wisdoms I've read multiple times over the years:

a) That investors in mutual funds - in the aggregate - underperform the performance of the mutual fund itself, primarily because they pile into the latest hot fund (whose performance decays thereafter), and

b) That reversion to the mean exists, meaning that stocks and mutual funds that have underperformed for a relative period, generally outperform in the following period.

Something has got to give - all of the above statements cannot be true. While I'm not certain which of the three has to give, I personally think it's the first one. Having seen more than a few investors, I tend to believe that a) is true, and by reasonable extrapolation, also applies to most other investors (i.e. not just those who invest in mutual funds).

I've also seen a fair number of studies showing that underperforming stocks rebound typically have a rebound (because they got priced too cheaply) and outperforming stocks often falter (because they became too expensive ... "priced for perfection). So I tend to think that b) is also true.

So, I'm going to say that I think bias #12 is probably false - and I think in fact it might be the opposite - investors holding "winners" for too long, and dumping "losers" too early.

But what do you think?


JW

The Confused Capitalist

Don't be dumb ...

and don't be dumb and dumber ...

Rick Konrad, over at a blog I enjoy reading, Value Discipline, had some kind words to say about the Confused Capitalist.

He went on to further discuss a point that mutual fund manager Tom Stanley had made that I relayed in a recent posting, the point being ...

Outperform by being different - if you really want to outperform the index, you have to strive to position yourself differently.

In his posting, Rick astutely points out that ...

The need to think differently just for the sake of being different is just as foolhardy. Have a rationale for your thinking, not just a bravado.

If you don't have this thought in your mind as well, well, then you are just being dumb and dumber. In his own portfolio management experience, Rick gives a good example of "what it takes" to outperform the index in this regard ...

I can recall one investment strategist telling me post 1987 crash how he still had faith in the consumer and was weighting the retail sector at 5% rather than the S&P's 3.5%. When I admitted that I had 25% of the portfolio in retail, he went ashen. He told me that I was reckless.

Rick further comments ...

The notion of long term horizons is also important. Almost every contrarian looks like an idiot for the near term.

Something to think about ... don't act dumb and dumber ... make sure you've well thought out why and how you want to position yourself differently than the index. Because underperformance is a very real possibility too.


JW

The Confused Capitalist